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Abstract—Government information is a vital asset that must 
be kept in a trusted environment and efficiently managed by 
authorised parties. Even though e-Government provides a 
number of advantages, it also introduces a range of new security 
risks. Sharing confidential and top-secret information in a secure 
manner among government sectors tend to be the main element 
that government agencies look for. Thus, developing an effective 
methodology is essential and it is a key factor for e-Government 
success. The proposed e-Government scheme in this paper is a 
combination of identity-based encryption and biometric 
technology. This new scheme can effectively improve the security 
in authentication systems, which provides a reliable identity with 
a high degree of assurance. In addition, this paper demonstrates 
the feasibility of using Finite-state machines as a formal method 
to analyse the proposed protocols. 
Keywords—e-Government; identity-based cryptosystem; 
biometrics; mutual authentication; FSM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
E-Government mainly acts as a communication bridge 
whether between government to citizen, or government to 
government, or government to business in efficient and 
reliable ways through effective use of information technology. 
The main challenge in e-government is to develop a 
framework, which promotes exchanging data securely among 
government agencies. While e-government provides a number 
of advantages, it also introduces a range of new security risks. 
Sharing confidential and top-secret information in a secure 
manner among government sectors tend to be the main 
element that government agencies look for. 
When e-Government systems were being designed, Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) seemed to be the best solution for the 
scheme. PKI is presently deployed in most e-Government 
implementations, as it is perceived as a mature technology, 
which is widely supported and can be easily integrated with 
different systems. Examples of e-government initiatives that 
apply PKI on a large scale are the US eGov initiative 
(www.usa.gov) supported by Federal PKI [1], the Saudi 
Arabian e-Government Program (yesser.gov.sa) [2].  
One of the main issues concerning the security perspective 
in e-Government is to grant access to authorised users as well 
as the need to verify that the user is really who they claim to 
be. The most common solution to this problem is to deploy a 
PKI [3] and digital signatures in large-scale e-Government 
systems. Even though PKI supports strong authentication and 
digital signature, it has a few disadvantages. For example, 
users must be pre-enrolled, certificate directories can leak 
some critical information, key recovery is difficult and costly 
and boundary services (anti-spam, anti-virus, archiving) 
integration is very difficult [4]. 
Thus, to take the full advantages of the capabilities of     e-
Government, end users need robust security solutions to 
achieve assurance when dealing with e-Government systems. 
A variant of public key cryptography that derives public keys 
directly from unique identity information (such as an e-mail 
address) known by the user is called Identity-Based 
Cryptography (IBC).  This approach has recently received 
considerable attention from researchers [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], as 
the development of ID-Based Cryptography offers great 
flexibility and obviates the requirement for user certificates 
since the identity of the user can be transformed into 
encryption keys and used for authentication. To develop a new 
secure cryptosystem for e-Government, several schemes were 
investigated to determine which protocol would be suitable for 
the research. We propose a biometric-ID-based scheme using 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC), which is an improved 
combination scheme derived from two schemes [10, 11].  The 
proposed scheme is secure under the Computational Diffie–
Hellman Assumption (CDHA) and tackles the security 
drawbacks of He et al.’s scheme and Li Hwang’s scheme. To 
overcome these, we applied a symmetric key cryptosystem to 
prevent attackers from altering or gaining any important 
information in the login and authentication messages. 
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. In 
Section 2, we review related works on ID-Based Cryptography 
and Biometric authentication and briefly describe both He et 
al.’s and Li Hwang schemes. In Section 3, we design the new 
Biometric-ID-based Authentication Scheme. In section 4, we 
model the new protocol with finite-state machine. Then, we 
provide a brief discussion on security analysis and 
comparisons with related schemes in section 5. Finally, the 
conclusion is given in Section 6. 
II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORKS 
Without a secure and trusted infrastructure, organisations, 
such as governments, would leave data electronically 
unsecured and vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, governments 
are constantly looking for ways to deliver secure and reliable 
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services. ID-Based Cryptography introduces a lightweight key 
management and offers encryption for data confidentiality and 
robust authentication, which are prerequisite for securing high-
value transactions.  
The idea of ID-based cryptography was originally 
proposed by Shamir in 1984 [12], but practical ID-based 
encryption schemes were not developed until recently. In 
2001, Boneh & Franklin [5] developed a fully functional ID-
based encryption scheme, which can be constructed efficiently 
by using Weil pairing on elliptic curves. In ID-based 
cryptosystems, there is a trusted third party called a Private 
Key Generator (PKG) who is responsible for generating the 
secret keys for all users. As a result, a PKG holds the users’ 
private keys. If a PKG is malicious, it can impersonate any 
user and therefore decrypt any cipher text or forge signature 
on any message. This can lead to a problem known as key 
escrow [13, 14]. 
There is no question that the Identity-Based Encryption 
(IBE) scheme brings many advantages such as eliminating the 
need to distribute public keys. The enforcement of the private 
key generation by the Private Key Generator raises concerns 
of key escrow and/or privacy surrounding the management of 
private keys. To address this particular problem of key escrow, 
an implementation of biometric identification systems can be 
used as a private key.  Biometric technology and verification 
systems offer a number of benefits to government sectors and 
users [15, 16]. 
He et al. [10] proposed an ID-based remote mutual 
authentication with key agreement scheme on ECC. This 
protocol attempts to cope with many of the well-known 
security and efficiency problem. However, the scheme has a 
potential flaw that may lead to man-in-the-middle attack and 
impersonation attack [17, 18]. It can be seen that, if an attacker 
E eavesdrops and listens to the communication between Si and 
Ci. Then, E can intercept a valid login request M1={IDCi, TCi , 
M, MACk(IDC
i
, TC
i
 ,M)} or h (IDi
 
|| Xs) and masquerade as a 
legal user.  
Biometric technologies are becoming fundamental 
elements in ensuring highly secure identification and personal 
verification solutions [15]. Biometric keys can be extracted 
from keystroke patterns, the human voice [19], fingerprints 
[20, 21], handwritten signatures [22], and facial characteristics 
[23].  
Li and Hwang [11] proposed an efficient biometrics-based 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The 
security of their scheme is based on one-way hash function, 
biometrics verification, smart card and it uses nonce. The 
scheme is very efficient in computation cost, which has been 
proved to be relatively low compared with other related 
schemes [24-27]. The scheme is composed of four phases 
namely; the registration phase, the login phase, the 
authentication phase and password change phase.  
One of the key characteristics of the cryptographic hash 
function is that the outputs are very sensitive to small 
perturbations in their inputs. Hash functions cannot be applied 
directly when the input data are noisy such as biometrics [28]. 
Therefore, a secure one-way hash function cannot be used for 
biometric verification. In the login phase of Li-Hwang’s 
scheme, the user computes h(Bi) based on personal biometric 
template Bi. Then, the biometric authentication process relies 
on comparing the hash value h(Bi) with fi . However, the 
scheme does not seem to be able to handle natural variation in 
the biometrics. For example, when the user logs in, his fresh 
biometric sample has to match exactly the template recorded 
during the registration phase, which never happens in practice. 
Thus, the protocol is fundamentally flawed and does not fulfil 
the basic objectives of a biometric authentication protocol. As 
a result, this may prevent a legal user from passing biometric 
verification at the login phase. So, the Li-Hwang’s scheme is 
vulnerable to denial-of-service attack. The scheme is also 
prone to man-in-middle-attack and impersonation attack. The 
attacker can cheat the server by impersonating the user or can 
impersonate the server to cheat the user without knowing any 
secret information [29-31] 
Combining ID based cryptography with biometric 
techniques can effectively improve the security in 
authentication systems, which provides a reliable identity with 
a high degree of assurance. The biometric technology is 
regarded as a powerful solution due to its unique link to an 
identity individual, which almost impossible to fake.  
Thus, a biometric identity is an inherent trait, which will 
always remain with the person all the time. In another words, 
using biometric techniques in IBE will mean that the person 
will always have their private key available.  
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
This research will focus on secure e-Government systems 
and improve their authentication and communication. To 
guarantee the security of these distributed systems, biometrics 
verification and ID-based cryptography are used. The 
proposed protocol is based on the following assumptions: 
 We assume that shared secrets in registration phase will 
never be disclosed.  
 We assume that cryptographic algorithms are secure. 
For example, it is impossible to decrypt a ciphertext 
without prior knowledge of the secret key. 
 We assume that both client and server are able to 
generate a random number securely. 
The security of the proposed scheme is based on the 
intractability of the following two mathematical problems on 
elliptic curves [5, 10]: 
a) Computational Diffie–Hellman Assumption (CDHA): 
Given P, xP, yP ∈ G, it is hard to compute xyP ∈ G. 
b) Collision Attack Assumption 1 (k-CAA1): For an 
integer k, and x∈ Zn*, P ∈ G ,given 
c) (P, xP, h0, (h1, (h1+x)-1P),….,(hk, (hk+x)-1P)) , 
where hi ∈ Zn*,  and distinct for 0 ≤  i ≤  k, it is hard to 
compute (h0+x)-1P . 
The proposed scheme consists of four phases: system 
initialising phase, registration phase, login phase, and 
authentication phase. The notations used throughout this paper 
are summarised in TABLE 1. 
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TABLE I. NOTATIONS USED IN THIS RESEARCH 
Symbol Definition 
Ci User/Client /Computer 
Si Server 
Ri Registration Centre 
IDS
i
 Identity of Server 
IDC
i
 Identity of user C 
PWC
i
 User’s password  
BioC
i
 Biometric template of C 
Pub_K Public Key 
Pr_K Private Key 
|| Message concatenation operation 
p, n Two large prime numbers 
Fp A finite field 
E An elliptic curve over a finite field F 
G The group of elliptic curve points on E 
P A point on elliptic curve E with order n 
xP Denotes point multiplication on elliptic curve  
y A piece of secret information maintained by the server 
(x, Pub_Ks) The server S’s Private/Public key pair, where      
Pub_Ks = xP 
rC
i 
, rS
i
 A random number chosen by the Ci and Si respectively  
H(.) A secure one-way hash function  
MACk(m) The secure message authentication code of m under the 
key k 
 XOR operation 
1) System initializing phase 
In this phase, we follow the steps in He et al.’s scheme 
where the server Si generates parameters of the system. 
Step 1: Si chooses an elliptic curve equation     EP(a, 
b). 
Step 2: Si selects a base point P with the order n over 
EP(a, b) 
Step 3: Si selects its master key x and secret 
information y and computes public key         Pub_Ks 
= xP 
Step 4: The server chooses four secure one-way hash 
function H1(.), H2(.), H3(.), H4(.), where H(.) is a 
known hash function that takes a string and assigns it 
to a point on the elliptic curve, i.e. H(A) = QA on E, 
where C is usually based on the identity 
 H1(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H1: 
{0, 1}* → Z*n 
 H2(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H2: 
{0, 1}* →  Z*p 
 H3(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H3: 
{0, 1}* →  Z*p 
 H4(.):a secure one-way hash function, where H4: 
{0, 1}* →  Z*p 
Also, the server chooses a message authentication code 
MACk(m). Then, it keeps x private and publishes {Fp, E, n, P, 
Pub_Ks, H1, H2, H3, H4, MACk(m)} 
2) Registration Phase 
A user Ci with identifier IDC
i
 should be registered first 
before using the services provided by Ri.  Users may use their 
employee number as an identity when contacting Ri for 
authorisation. In this phase, Ci needs to perform the following 
steps. 
Step 1: User Ci inputs their IDC
i
, personal biometrics 
BioC
i
, on a specific biometric device, and provides 
the password PWC
i
 to Ri via a secure channel (or to 
the registration centre in person). 
 
 Step 2: Ri reads current timestamp TS
i
, and computes 
the following: 
fi = H4 (BioC
i
 )  
zi = H4 (PWC
i
 || fi) 
ei = H4 (IDC
i 
|| y) ⊕ zi 
 
Step 3: Ri computes Ci’s private key using the system 
private key x and Ci’s public key. 
Pr_KC
i
 = (x+ H4 (IDC
i
))-1 P ∈ G   
Pub_KC
i = H4 ((IDCi) + x) P =  H4 ((IDCi)P + Pub_Ks)  
Step 4: Ri stores {IDC
i
, H4 (.), Enc{ }a/Dec{ }a, fi, ei, 
τ, Pr_KC
i
} on a secure database and sends it to the 
user via a secure channel, where                   Enc{ 
}a/Dec{ }a is a symmetric encryption with secret key 
a and and τ is a predetermined threshold [28] for 
biometric verification.  
3) Login Phase 
The user Ci sends a login request to the server Si and 
performs the following steps:  
 
Step 1: Ci enters the IDC
i
 and PWC
i 
, and then Si 
verifies the authenticity of client’s identity and 
password.  
 
Step 2: Ci submits the BioC
i
 on specific biometric 
device, then verifies the following: 
    Accept if d(BioC
i
,
 
Bio
*
C
i
)  < τ 
     Reject if d(BioC
i
,
 
Bio
*
C
i
)  ≥ τ 
Step 3: if the above does not hold, it means the 
biometric information does not match the template 
stored in system. Thus Ci does not pass the biometric 
verification process and the authentication scheme is 
terminated. Otherwise, Ci passes the biometric 
verification and computes the following:  
fi = H4 (BioC
i
 )  
   i
 = H4 (PWC
i
 || fi) 
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M1 = ei ⊕    i  =  H4 (IDC
i 
|| y) 
W1 =  rC
i 
. P 
M2 =  rC
i 
. Pr_KC
i
 
M3 =  M1 ⊕ rC
i
 
Where rC
i
∈ Z*n is a random number generated by the 
user. For this step, the random value rC
i
 is introduced 
to mask the hash of the secret value H4 (IDC
i
 || y). 
 
Step 4: Ci computes k = H2 (IDC
i
, TC
i
, W1, M2), 
where T C
i
 is a timestamp denoting the current time. 
 
Step 5: Finally, Ci encrypts the message {IDC
i
, TC
i
, 
W1, M3, MACk (IDC
i
, TC
i
, W1, M3)}a and sends it to 
the server Si 
 
4) Authentication Phase 
After receiving the request login message, Si and Ci will 
perform the following steps for mutual authentication. 
 
Step 1: Si decrypts the message {IDC
i
, T C
i
, W1, M3, 
MACk (IDC
i
, T C
i
, W1, M3)}a, then checks the validity 
of IDC
i
 and the freshness of TC
i
. The freshness of TC
i
 
is checked by performing T  – TC
i
    T, where T  is 
the time when Si receives the above message and  T 
is a valid time interval. The case where IDC
i
 is not 
valid or TC
i
 is not fresh, then Si aborts the current 
session.  
 
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, Si computes the following:  
M2 =  (x + H1(IDC
i
)-1  W1  
      = Pr_KCi . rCi 
k = H2 (IDC
i
, T C
i
, W1, M2) 
Si checks the integrity of MACk (IDC
i
, T C
i
, 
W1, M3) with the key k. Si will quit the 
current session if the check produces a 
negative result. 
 
Step 3: If Step 2 holds, Si chooses a random number 
RS
i
 ∈ Z*n and computes the following: 
M4 = H4 (IDC
i || y) 
W2 =  rS
i 
. P 
KS
i
 =  rS
i 
. W1 
The session key sk = H3 (IDC
i
, TC
i
, TS
i
, W1, 
W2, KS
i
), where TS
i
 is a timestamp denoting 
the current time 
M5 = M3 ⊕ M4 = rC
i
 
M6 = M4 ⊕ rS
i
 
M7 = H4(M3 || M5) 
Where M5 is the random value rC
i
 of the user 
Ci and only Si can unmask the value because 
it can compute H4 (IDC
i  || y) 
 
Step 4: Then, Si encrypts the message {IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, 
M6, M7, MACk(IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, M6, M7)}a and sends it 
to Ci  
 
Step 5: Upon receiving the Si’s message, Ci first 
decrypts {IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, 
M6, M7)}a , and checks the freshness of TS
i
 is by 
performing T’– TS
i
    T, where T  is the time when 
Ci receives the above message and  T is the expected 
time interval for the transmission delay. 
 
Step 6: Ci verifies whether M7 ≟ H4 (M3 || rC
i
) and 
checks the integrity of MACk (IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, M6, M7) 
with the key k. Ci will quit the current session if the 
check produces a negative result.  
 
Step 7: If it holds, Ci believes that Si is authenticated 
and then computes the following: 
KC
i
 = rC
i
 . W2 
The session key sk = H3 (IDC
i
, TC
i
, TS
i
, W1, 
W2, KC
i
) 
M8 = M6 ⊕ M1 = rS
i
 
M9 = H4(M6 || M8) 
Where M9 is the random value rS
i
 of the 
server Si and only the client Ci, which know 
M1 = H4 (IDC
i
|| y), can send back the correct 
hashed value of M9 = H4 (H4 (IDC
i
|| y) ⊕ rS
i
) 
|| rS
i
) 
 
Step 8: Ci sends the encrypted message             {M9, 
MACk(M9) }a to Si 
 
Step 9: After receiving Ci’s message, Si decrypts 
Enc{M9}a and check the integrity of MACk(M9). 
Then, Si verifies whether M9 ≟ H4 (M6 || rS
i
)  
 
Step 10: If the above mentioned holds, Si accept Ci’s 
login request or otherwise rejects it 
IV. PROTOCOL MODEL AND STATE MACHINE 
Verification is a crucial step in designing security 
protocols. A Finite-State machine (FSM) is a powerful tool to 
simulate software architecture and communication protocols. 
FSM can only model the control part of a system and consists 
of finite number of states, finite number of events, and finite 
number of transitions. An FSM may be regarded as a five-
tuple [32]: (Q, ∑,  , σ, ԛ0), where: 
 Q: finite set of symbols denoting states 
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 ∑:  set of symbols denoting the possible inputs 
  : set of symbols denoting the possible outputs 
 σ: transition function mapping to Qx∑ to Qx  
 ԛ0 є Q:  initial state. 
The FSM is used to model the communication channel of 
proposed protocol between the Client Ci and the Server Si. 
Since the exchange of packets follows a pattern defined by a 
finite set of rules, it will be described by creating two finite-
state machines FSMserver and FSMclient. 
A. Server FSM 
The FSM at the server side represents the various on-going 
communications with the client at any point of time. It is 
modelled using 10 states and 22 transitions as detailed below.  
Fig. 1 shows the transitions diagram for the FSMserver. 
1) The FSMserver will loop itself as the server is waiting 
for clients. The machine advances to the next state once it is 
triggered by a login/enrol transition accordingly. 
2) When the FSMserver is in the state S1, it checks the 
validity of the received ID. If ID proved to be incorrect, Si will 
request Ci to enter the valid ID for three times and FSMserver 
will loop until Ci enters the valid ID or if the attempts exceed 
three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s account will be blocked 
and FSMserver changes state to S4 from state S1. Generally, 
three attempts are made through our protocol steps to allow 
common errors. 
3) When the FSMserver is in the state S2, it is triggered by 
valid ID and it is now waiting for a valid PW. Once Si receives 
PW, it verifies its validity. If PW proved to be wrong, Si will 
request Ci to enter the valid PW for three times and FSMserver 
will loop until Ci enters the valid PW or if the attempts exceed 
three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s account will be blocked 
and FSMserver changes state to S4 from state S2.  
4) When the FSMserver is in the state S3, it is triggered by 
valid PW and it is now waiting for a valid Bio. Once Si 
receives Bio, it verifies its validity by comparing the imprinted 
Bio with the template stored. If Bio did not match the stored 
template, Si will request Ci to enter the valid Bio up to three 
times and the FSMserver will loop until Ci enters the valid PW 
or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and the FSMserver changes state to S4 
from state S3. 
5) In state S5, the FSMserver waits until receives the login 
request SYN = {IDC
i
, TC
i
, W1, M3, MACk(IDC
i
, TC
i
, W1, M3)}a 
from the FSMclient to establish a connection by performing 
three-ways-handshake.  
6) While in State S5, the FSMserver checks the validity of 
ID, freshness of T and the integrity of MACk. Then Si generates 
a random number and timestamp in order to calculates the 
session key sk = H3(IDC
i
, TC
i
, TS
i
, W1, W2, KS
i
). Afterward, Si 
replies SYN/ACK = {IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, 
M6, M7)}a to the FSMclient. 
7) In state S6, FSMserver waits until receives ACK from 
the FSMclient. Once the FSMclient sends ACK = {M9}a, 
FSMserver verifies M9≟H4 (M6 || rS
i
). At this instance, Si 
authenticates Ci as a legitimate user.  
8) At state S5 and state S6, FSMserver terminates the 
current session if any of the following situations occurs: 
 The client ID is invalid 
 The freshness of T  – TC
i
 ≥  T 
 Negative result when checking the integrity of 
MACk(IDC
i
, TC
i
, W1, M3)  
 If M9 != H4 (M6 || rS
i
)  
At any stage of FSMserver, FSMserver aborts the current 
session and changes to state S9 if the timeout exceeds the 
defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This feature 
helps to prevent an infinite wait when the FSMclient fails to 
response.  
B. Client FSM 
The FSM at the client side represents the various on-going 
transmissions with the server at any point of time. It is 
modelled using 9 states and 21 transitions as detailed below. 
Fig. 1 shows the transitions diagram for the FSMclient. 
1) First, the FSMclient is in the initial state C0 that is 
when the request for register/login is initiated by itself. While 
in state C0, the FSMserver checks whether Ci is enrolled or not. 
The next state will be decided according to the condition 
ClientReg == True. 
2) In state C1, C2, C3, the FSMclient is waiting for 
validating ID, PW, and Bio. Once the client credentials are 
validated.  The FSMclient triggers itself and changes to state 
C5. 
3) In states C1, C2, C3, the client may require to re-
enter ID, PW, Bio in case if they were incorrect. However, the 
client’s account will be blocked if the number of attempts 
exceeds three trials, which change the above states to state 
C4.  
 ID_attempt < 3, ID_attempt = ID_attempt +1 
 PW_attempt < 3, PW_attempt = PW_attempt +1 
 Bio_Attempt  < 3, Bio_attempt = Bio_attempt +1 
4) In state C5, The FSMclient generates a random number 
and timestamp to calculate the encrypted login request {IDC
i
, 
T C
i
, W1, M3, MACk (IDC
i
, T C
i
, W1, M3)}a and sends it to the 
FSMserver. This request represents the SYN part in the three-
way handshake procedure.  
5) While in state C5, the FSMclient is waiting for the 
FSMserver response after sending the login request to establish 
the connection. 
6) In state C6, the FSMclient is validating the FSMserver 
response by checking the integrity of MACk, ∆T and M7 ≟ H4 
(M4 || rC
i
). If Si proved to be honest, Ci authenticates Si at this 
stage. 
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Fig. 1. Proposed Scheme FSM Model 
7) While in state C6, the FSMclient computes the shared 
session key sk = H3(IDC
i
, TC
i
, TS
i
, W1, W2, KC
i
) and finalises 
the handshake procedure by sending ACK = {M9}a to Si. 
8) In state C7, the FSMclient is waiting to be 
authenticated by Si.  
9) In state C8, the client terminates the current session 
if one of the following occurs: 
 Negative result when checking the integrity of MACk  
 The freshness of T  – TS
i
 ≥  T 
 M7 ≟ H4 (M4 || rC
i
) 
At any stage of FSMclient, FSMclient aborts the current 
session and changes to state C9 if the timeout exceeds the 
defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets.  
This feature helps to prevent an infinite wait when the 
FSMserver fails to response.     
C. Register FSM 
The FSM at Registration side represents the various on-
going transmissions with the server and client at any point of 
time. It is modelled using 4 states and 7 transitions as detailed 
below.  
Figure 1 shows the transitions diagram for the FSMregister. 
1)  First, the FSMregister is triggered if the client is not 
enrolled R0, that is when the request for register is initiated by 
FSMclient. While in state C0, the FSMserver checks whether Ci is 
enrolled. 
2) When once Ci enters ID, FSMregister changes to state 
R1 and validates the format of ID. FSMregister triggers itself. 
Then FSMregister asks Ci to enter PW and changes to state R2. 
3) In state R2, on receiving PW for the first time, 
FSMregister requires Ci to re-enter PW for confirmation. Then it 
triggers and changes to the state R3. 
4) In state R3, Ci is required to submit multiple scans of 
the biometric data to increase accuracy. Once the acquisition 
process is complete, FSMregister trigger itself and sends a 
message to R0, which indicates that the enrolment is 
successful. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISIONS 
The analysis suggests that the proposed scheme is well-
designed for data confidentiality by using symmetric 
cryptography during the handshake procedure.  Also, it 
ensures data integrity by applying a Message Authentication 
Code function (MAC). Typically, the MAC function takes as 
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input a secret key and data block and produces a hash value 
[33]. The client and server transmit the MAC value during the 
login and authentication phases. However, both client and 
server will be aware if an attacker alters the message because 
the integrity check of MAC value fails. When the 
communication session between Ci and Si is over, the session 
key sk is discarded and a new session key is used in every 
protocol run to prevent a replay attack.  
Mutual authentication and session key agreement 
Based on FSM model, we proved that the protocol 
accomplished mutual authentication and secret session key 
agreement between a remote client and the server by 
establishing three-way challenge-response handshake 
technique. First, the client Ci sends the login request message 
{IDC
i
, TC
i
, W1, M3, MACk (IDC
i
, TC
i
, W1, M3)} to the server Si. 
Then Si verifies the received message by checking the MAC 
integrity. After validating, Si sends a challenge message {IDC
i
, 
TS
i
, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDC
i
, TS
i
, W2, M6, M7)} to Ci. Next, Ci 
check the validity of the received message M7 ≟ H4 (M4 || rC
i
) 
and accept or reject the server request according to the 
verification result. Finally, Ci sends a response message M9 = 
H4 (H4 (IDC
i
|| y) ⊕ rS
i
) || rS
i
) to Si. Upon receiving the message, 
Si verifies if M9 ≟ H4 (M6 || rS
i
) holds. If so, S authenticates 
client Ci and allows him to get access.  During the process, 
both Si and Ci compute the session key sk = H3 (IDC
i
, TC
i
, TS
i
, 
W1, W2, (rS
i
 .rC
i
 .P)) successfully.  
Denial-of-service-attack 
Our scheme can withstand denial-of-service attack, 
because when the client Ci imprints personal biometrics 
Bio*C
i
, the Si will check the validity of Bio
*
C
i
 with stored 
template by checking whether d(BioC
i
,
 
Bio*C
i
)  < τ holds. 
According to [31], the Bio*C
i
 could pass the verification 
process even though there is some slight difference between 
BioC
i
,
 
Bio*C
i
. 
As for the computation cost, the proposed protocol is 
relatively low cost and efficient since only symmetric 
encryption; hash operations and XOR operations are required. 
Moreover, it is based on ECC which has significant 
advantages over other public-key cryptography. ECC provides 
the same security level of RSA cryptosystem but with a 
shorter key length and faster computation [34] 
In TABLE 2, we summarised the performance and 
demonstrated comparisons between the proposed scheme and 
other related schemes. The evaluation parameters are defined 
in TABLE 3. Even though the number of operations is more 
than in other schemes, our scheme holds other security 
properties. The proposed protocol is based on a two-factor 
user authentication mechanism and it is obvious that it takes 
few more hash operations and XOR operations for the server 
and client. Due to the security weaknesses in related schemes, 
we applied symmetric encryption and symmetric decryption to 
ensure the confidentiality and the integrity of transmitted 
packets.  Therefor this feature makes the proposed scheme 
effective. 
TABLE II. PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS 
 He et al.’s 
Scheme 
Li-Hwang’s 
Scheme 
Proposed Scheme 
Client 2TH + 2TMAC 3TH + 3TX 
6TH + 3TX + 3TMAC + 
2TSE + TSD 
Server 4TH + 2TMAC 4TH + 2TX 
6TH  + 2TX + 3TMAC + 
1TSE + 2TSD 
TABLE III. EVALUATION PARAMETERS 
Symbol Definition 
TX Time for executing an XOR operation 
TH Time for executing a one-way hash function 
TMAC Time for executing a message authentication code  
TSE Time for executing a symmetric encryption operation 
TSD Time for executing a symmetric decryption operation 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The paper demonstrates how a combination of ID-based 
encryption with biometrics can be effective and more suited to 
e-Government environments. Moreover, the new biometric-
identity-based scheme can be integrated into e-Government 
systems as the main authentication method and for secure 
communication as well. The proposed scheme is aimed to 
initiate secure authentication and communication between the 
client and server by building a robust mechanism between 
communicating government parties. The presented protocol is 
described as a three-way handshake procedure to establish a 
reliable connection and ensure secure data sharing.   
In future, an in-depth security analysis and evaluation will 
be conducted to overcome security vulnerabilities and 
weakness. Furthermore, it is essential to consider using Petri 
Net (PN) [35] to simulate the communication patterns between 
the server and client as well as to validate the protocol 
functionality. First, we will model the protocol without an 
intruder. Then, we will add the intruder to PN and implement 
a token-passing scheme. At this stage, we will test different 
attacks, such as impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle 
attack, and replay attack against the proposed scheme and 
verify the security requirements.  
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